Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu
As American foreign policy pivots toward the Indo-Pacific, a shift that would rightly accelerate should former President Donald Trump win in November, questions loom regarding how the United States might encourage its European partners to bolster their national and collective security. Such measures are critical not only for Europe’s own sake, but also for the broader goal of countering and prevailing against the revisionist authoritarian axis of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea that now menaces the free world.
Despite some increases in defense spending — Germany and Norway, for instance, will commit 2% of their gross domestic products to defense for the first time this year — there is little evidence of improved military capabilities or increased troop numbers. This, even as Europe grapples with its largest ground conflict since World War II and an expanding Chinese military presence. Last week, for example, Chinese and Belarusian forces conducted an 11-day joint exercise, “Eagle Assault 2024,” in Belarus, less than three miles from the Polish border.
Still, many Europeans appear more anxious about the prospect of a Vice President J.D. Vance than their own security vulnerabilities.
Certainly, this curious reluctance to take charge of their security is not shared across all of Europe. Poland is poised to allocate 5% of its GDP to defense next year, the highest among NATO nations. Estonia could see similar outlays, with upgrades to its defense systems and manpower.
Yet these are exceptions rather than the norm. Norway, despite its increased military expenditures, foresees improved defense systems and expanded conscript and reservist programs only by 2036. Its government is forced to balance defense spending with social welfare programs, which consume some 63% of the national budget.
Germany, Europe’s economic and military linchpin, plans to halve its military aid to Ukraine next year, reducing it to 4 billion euros ($4.35 billion), according to its preliminary 2025 budget. The German defense ministry will also receive 1.2 billion euros, “significantly less” than requested. While Germany’s historic aversion to high defense spending is understandable, history can no longer justify inadequate spending today, when the threats to Germany, Europe, and the free world grow daily.
The British historian A.J.P. Taylor once wrote about the year 1848 that “German history reached its turning point but missed its turn.” Should it continue on its current path, Europe risks a similar fate.
Short of warning of its diminishing European force posture or threatening to withhold security guarantees from NATO members that spend less than 2% of GDP on defense, as suggested by retired Army Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, Washington, D.C., can only do so much. It is, in any case, not its job to convince Europe to prioritize its own security. Such resolve must come from the Europeans themselves.
Such resolve would necessitate a reallocation of national budgets to focus on defense investments, whether through tax increases, spending cuts, or lending.
For Europe, the choice between guns and butter is, regrettably, very real. It would involve the pursuit of policies to address troop shortages. Latvia, for instance, reinstated mandatory conscription last year, while Lithuania extended its conscription period just last month.
A Europe committed to its security would also adopt unified defense strategies, starting with a clear and credible endgame for the war in Ukraine. Its leaders would also do well to improve their communications on the necessity of prioritizing such measures to their people, many of whom have yet to grasp the urgency.
Should Europe advance in this manner, it could eventually assume a more prominent role within NATO’s regional commands. There is, for instance, no reason why the command in Naples, Italy, should not be led by Italian or Spanish admirals rather than the American four-star general in charge. Such a move would enable Europe to assume greater control over its security while allowing the U.S. to concentrate on threats in the Indo-Pacific. Yet should Europe stay its course, it and the free world could face a much different reality.
If Europe continues to dither on defense and hold to fanciful notions of perpetual U.S. security protections, it risks not only an expanded Russian and Chinese presence on the continent but an endangered trans-Atlantic alliance. Should Europe cease to be regarded as a credible security partner, Washington could, indeed, opt to let it “do whatever the hell they want,” as Trump put it. Washington could also turn to smaller, more committed coalitions, which could deepen European fragmentation.
Neither outcome is desirable, and the path forward rests with Europe. There are those who understand this and grasp the gravity of the continent’s security risks and the stakes involved. These are the voices that should be amplified. Where fitting, they should be elected to office. Needed in Europe is leadership — for it, and the free world, cannot afford that it misses its turn.
Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu (@awgadzala) is the founder of the geopolitical risk firm Magpie Advisory, a visiting fellow at Independent Women’s Forum, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and a contributing editor with the New York Sun.
