Hamas fighters take part in a military parade in Gaza on July 19 to mark the anniversary of the 2014 war with Israel. | REUTERS
BY CHIE EZAKI | Japan Times
CONTRIBUTING WRITER
Hamas was founded in Gaza in December 1987 and it has been substantially controlling the area since June 2007. In addition to Gaza, Hamas is present in refugee camps in the West Bank and has a strong base in East Jerusalem, considered part of the West Bank and, therefore, of the Palestinian territories, under international law.
The group supplies funding to and therefore buys the loyalty of young men who believe in violent resistance to the Israeli occupation.
At dawn on Oct. 7, Hamas, whose full name means “Islamic Resistance Movement,” started its latest operation against Israel. The scope and scale of it was broad, and it was a big surprise that Hamas managed to break through the border fence surrounding the Gaza Strip and enter Israel, breaching its security. In addition, the number of hostages taken by Hamas — 199 according to the Israeli Defense Forces — was the highest ever.
Israel, on its part, is preparing to launch an invasion into Gaza by air, land and sea. The operation is expected to be a heavy assault in response to the atrocities committed by Hamas, which have prompted Israeli cries for an invasion of Gaza. Judging by what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said, the aim is to obliterate the Palestinian group.
It was anticipated that the Israeli ground offensive might start last weekend as, on Friday, Israel issued an evacuation notice urging 1.1 million residents of northern Gaza to move south within 24 hours. However, the deadline of 5 a.m. the following day was pushed back, and the Israeli Defense Forces issued a statement that they would allow Palestinians safe passage on approved routes between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. on Saturday.
Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have left their homes.
In parallel to the attacks and counter attacks between Israel and Hamas, diplomatic efforts have been continuing to avoid the already dire humanitarian crisis from precipitating further.
The Israeli military said that it carried out counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank on Saturday night, arresting 49 suspects, 33 of whom were members of Hamas. This could be evidence that Hamas’ presence in the West Bank is also strong, and that Israel intends to try and end Hamas not only in Gaza but also in the West Bank.
Two of the organization’s top leaders in the Gaza Strip have styled a so-called “zero problem” foreign policy. The intention is to emphasize Hamas’ partnership with countries that share its anti-Israel stance: Hamas is careful not to let its relationships with Arab states deteriorate because that would strengthen the Israeli position.
This is one signal that tells us that Hamas, notwithstanding its brutal tactics, is a rational actor whose approach is also based on pragmatism.
Another example of this is the way violence is controlled based on public sentiments in Gaza. Although Hamas has launched missiles targeting Israel many times before, it has respected ceasefires when these have been adopted. This shows that Hamas judges when it is suitable to conduct assaults against Israel also based on its interpretation of people’s sentiments.
The most recent aggression was prompted by a few factors.
The first stems from the asymmetric power structure that has dominated the relationship between Israel and Palestine for nearly 70 years. As stated in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice presented in June 2004 with regards to Israel’s construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Israel is “the occupying power” and Palestine is “the occupied (territory).”
In these circumstances, no one can deny that there is a historical complaint against and dissatisfaction toward the Israeli occupation, which since 1967 has imposed itself on land that Palestinians regard as their own.
Second, as the occupation has continued over time, the importance of the Palestine problem for regional as well as international actors has drastically diminished.
Once, it was essential for Arab leaders to commit to the Palestinian cause politically and militarily because it was an important symbol and a way of obtaining support from their peoples.
However, since the Second Intifada (or “uprising”) broke out in September 2000, a recognition that the Middle East peace process had failed became dominant. These events also pushed Israel away from the negotiating table with Palestine.
Even though the Obama administration in the U.S. made efforts to revive negotiations, recognizing that the resolution of the Palestinian conflict is core to stability in the Middle East, the outbreak of the Arab Spring in the early 2010s changed the regional security environment and impacted the priorities of Arab leaders — which shifted toward their national interests and away from their involvement in the Palestinian issue.
As part of this turn, in the absence of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, some Arab leaders pursued normalization of ties with Israel, backed by the Trump administration.
It is useful to understand Hamas’ aggression as a warning as to the Palestinians’ current situation. This includes their exclusion from regional peace efforts and their demand that international society, including Arab and Islamic countries, not forget their existence and aspirations.
On another level, the political impasse in the Palestinian political arena should not be underestimated. Hamas has been excluded from the Palestinian Authority founded on the Oslo Accords of 1993, even though it won Palestinian legislative elections in 2006.
International society declined to accept the result and boycotted a new cabinet consisting only of Hamas. Since June 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza, the political struggle between Hamas and Fatah, which dominates the Palestinian Authority and is recognized as a negotiating partner by international actors, has deepened.
Although both parties have tried to reconcile several times through efforts mediated by Egypt, Turkey and Russia, among others, national unity governments have never survived for long and Hamas’ predicaments, such as the blockade of the Gaza Strip by Israel and Egypt, have continued. (It should be noted that, in the past, Hamas has tried bargaining with Israel and other parties — including by taking hostages — to ease the blockade.)
On top of this, the President of the State of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, postponed elections that were meant to be held in April 2021, a decision criticized by Hamas. It is said that one of the reasons for the delay is that Abbas feared a Hamas win.
Hamas recognizes that the possibility of it being recognized as a legitimate political actor in Palestine has been prevented not only by the international community but also by Palestinian leaders, mainly belonging to Fatah.
These factors could be regarded as the root of Hamas’ dissatisfaction.
In addition, given that support for the group seems to persist in the West Bank, Hamas expects that the increasing international, regional and local attention it is receiving in the present crisis will strengthen its influence in the Palestinian political arena. To the point where the pressure to hold new elections at a later date will likely increase.
Chie Ezaki is an associate professor at the Department of International Relations of the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture.